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R

eaders of this Journal need no schooling in the acceleration of the use of improvised explosive devices

Booby
Trap

(IED) over the last 20 years. However, what has be-

come obvious in the last few years is the degree to which the
spheres of counter-IED (C-IED) and humanitarian mine action (HMA) now overlap. Danish Demining Group (DDG),
for example, recently calculated that an estimated 67 percent
of the countries where DDG is present also have an IED problem. In countries such as Afghanistan, IEDs are now the major cause of explosive-related casualties among the general

IED

Mine

population, the very constituents nongovernment organizations (NGO) and HMA sectors support. This raises questions
of whether or not an NGO engaged in C-IED efforts can be
classically impartial in circumstances where these IEDs are
active. This is a significant difference for a sector primarily fo-

“Artisanal Mine”

cused on dealing with the legacies of conflict that are explosive remnants of war (ERW). Yet, while undertaking a series
of risk assessments to help identify an appropriate approach
for an NGO active in HMA, it became clear that there was a
need for better common terminology in order for HMA actors
to identify the appropriate response. The aim of this article is
to outline how this thought process evolved in DDG in order to set the ground for subsequent discussion of these risk-

Figure 1. How IED terms overlap.
Figure courtesy of the author.

(UXO), or built around a repurposed item of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) found in an unsecured or raided ammunition stockpile. It might also be built from scratch from

analysis processes.

homemade explosives (HME). However, the common factor

What is an IED?

provised as opposed to factory-made, standardized weapons

The name says it all. An IED is an explosive device that is
made in an improvised manner. British parliamentarians currently define an IED as:
A device placed or fabricated in an improvised
manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious,
pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to

amongst these variations is that these constructions are imused for their intended purpose. In summary, the term IED is
about how the weapon is made.
What is the difference between an IED, a booby trap, or
an improvised mine? Not much, in some cases. A booby trap
is defined as follows:
An explosive or non-explosive device, or other material,

destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract.1

deliberately placed to cause casualties when an apparently

This term hides a multiplicity of variations: it might be a

harmless object is disturbed or a normally safe act is

device based on a recycled item of unexploded ordnance

performed.2
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Security incidents are all enemy action (i.e. enemy-initiated direct fire and indirect fire i.e. mortar, rocket and artillery,
surface-to-air fire, and explosive hazard) events to include executed attacks (i.e. IED explosion, mine strike) and potential
or attempted attacks (i.e. IEDs, mines found & cleared, premature IED detonations, IED turn-ins) which are not included.
Security incidents do not include friendly action incidents such as direct fire and indirect fire that are initiated by friendly
forces. Enemy-initiated attacks are all enemy action (i.e. enemy-initiated direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire) and
explosive hazard events to include executed attacks only (i.e. IED explosions and mine strikes). Potential or attempted
attacks (i.e. IEDs/mines found & cleared, premature IED detonations, IED turn-ins) are not included.
IED events comprise explosive hazard events, both executed (i.e. IED explosion/mine strike) and potential IED/mine attacks
(i.e. IEDs/mines found & cleared, premature IED detonations, IED turn-ins).
A complex attack is an attack conducted by multiple hostile elements which employ at least two distinct classes of weapon
systems (i.e. indirect fire and direct fire, IED, and surface-to-air fire) against one or more targets.
Figure 2. NATO weapons definitions from Afghanistan. Note that this does include reference to “legacy” incidents from explosive
remnants of war.
Figure courtesy of UNMAS.

One can immediately see how easily these two terms over-

author’s perspective, this attempt to square the definition cir-

lap. It is possible to set up an IED to produce such a situation.

cle is not helpful. The terms describe different attributes, and

Yet the term booby trap can also apply to non-explosive traps

trying to make them fit a convenient perspective could simply

(e.g., punji sticks in Vietnam) and a command-detonated IED

add further confusion.4 Perhaps a booby trap is not a separate

is not necessarily linked to the person carrying out an appar-

type of weapon but merely another method of deployment.

ently harmless act. If the term IED is about how the device is

How do IEDs fit into the spectrum of explosive incidents?

made, the term booby trap describes how the device is set up

In situations of counterinsurgency, asymmetric warfare, or

to function.

internal security, the civilian population, civil power, human-

Thirdly, one must consider how improvised or artisanal

itarian actors, and security forces face a range of different ex-

mines fit into this taxonomy. The 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine

plosive threats, of which IEDs are only part of the spectrum.

Ban Convention (APMBC) defined a mine as:

NATO’s early work in Afghanistan helps to untangle the

any munition placed under, on or near the ground or other

range of these threats.5 Figure 2 was developed as a risk as-

surface area and designed to be detonated or exploded by

sessment carried out by the author on behalf of the U.N. Mine

the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle.3

Here we see another overlap. Mines are commonly factorybuilt, but it is quite possible to make a victim-operated IED.
The mine definition is about how the device is initiated.
One could easily spend time wrestling with these definitions. Take any particular device: which one of these categories does it fit into? In many cases, a given device can fit in two,
sometimes even three, categories at once. Because these terms
developed from different historical roots, they overlap and describe different attributes of the device: the way it is constructed,
the way it is set up, and the way it is initiated (Figure 1, page 5).
If the terms aren’t used correctly, there is a risk of overreporting the problem. Secondly, because of their improvised
nature, IEDs often require different training and equipment
for counteractions; if the problem is misunderstood, the balance of training and other resources will also be wrong.
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Action Service (UNMAS) in Mali in October 2015.
Figure 3 (page 7) helps clarify a number of points. First, current security incidents (case 2) can stand alongside incidents
from legacy weapons (case 1). In fact, these legacy weapons led
to the establishment of the HMA sector. Second, current and
active security incidents can involve a range of weapons that
are not IEDs, including direct fire, indirect fire from factorybuilt mortars, surface-to-air missile (SAM) attacks on civil
aircraft, or placement of factory-built anti-tank mines—all of
which are significant but not IED incidents. It should also be
noted that, for clarity, the diagram does not include the range
of criminal weapon uses that might be included under a wider
definition of armed violence (case 3) such as armed robbery,
inter-communal disputes, or even domestic violence.
How Do We Describe Different IEDs?

Moreover, there have been efforts to adjust the definition

During the 20th century, simpler terms were in use such as

of booby trap to only cover factory-built devices. From the

letter bombs, parcel bombs, unattended bags, and car bombs.
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letters. Yet an IED in a car initiated by a com-

Weapons
Incidents

mand wire could be reported by a peacekeeping
contingent as a VBIED while another unit re-

1. Legacy
Incidents
(ERW)

2. Security
incidents

cords an identical device as a CWIED. There are

3. Other “Armed
Violence”

two implications. The security forces will be unable to correctly analyze the threat and design
the appropriate response if the dataset is incom-

2.1 Direct Fire

2.2 Indirect Fire

2.3 Surface/Air

2.4 Explosive
Hazard Event

plete. Additionally, it will be harder to design
appropriate risk education from the humanitarian perspective if both attributes are not clearly

2.4a Executed

2.4b Potential

2.4c False Alarm

understood.
Risk is a precise mathematical term that considers both the probability of a particular inci-

2.4a(1) Mine

dent occurring and the severity of its outcome.

2.4a(2) IED

The containment of an IED and its size speaks
directly to the severity of the potential outcome.

2.4b(1) Cache

A Unabomber-style letter bomb can potentially

2.4b(2) Found

hurt one or two people: a van full of ammonium
nitrate can bring down an entire federal build-

2.4c(1) Hoax

2.4c(2)
Unintended

Figure 3. Description of IEDs.
Figure courtesy of the author.

ing in Oklahoma, whereas the means of initiation speaks to the probability of the incidence.
Furthermore, good risk education processes
discuss and suggest safe behavior. In order to
do this, it is critical that the people designing

These terms were not precise but counter-IED personnel knew

the risk education programs have a good understanding of the

what they meant. In recent years, there has been a signifi-

typical means of initiation used in order to provide advice on

cant proliferation of terms (particularly involving acronyms)

indicators, safe behavior, and containment.8

intended to make our vocabulary more exact. However, this

As a result, a matrix is the suggested means of describing

article argues that the opposite was achieved. We now have

and recording IED incidents, rather than a simple list of terms

vehicle-born IEDs (VBIED), victim-operated IEDs (VOIED),

(Figure 4, page 8).

command wire detonated IEDs (CWIED), suicide vehicleborne IEDs (SVBIED), improvised rocket-assisted munitions
(IRAM), etc. While it is comparatively easy to learn what these
acronyms mean, perhaps they obscure what is actually needed
for a fuller analysis.
These terms describe one or both of two main attributes
of IEDs: the nature of the containment and the means of initiation. Thus a VBIED can be command detonated by wire
(CWIED) or remote control (RCIED), it could be detonated
on a timer, victim-operated (VOIED) or be operated by a suicide bomber (SVBIED). So, which one of these is it?6
Currently, organizations tend to use a reporting form with

Implications for Humanitarian Actors
There is clearly an overlap of IED, booby trap, and mine definitions. The terms are not interchangeable. The C-IED and
HMA practitioners stand to benefit from recognizing this, as
they set the basis for the rest of the taxonomy. Moreover, IEDs
are only one part of a series of explosive and weapon-related
hazards that might be faced in a particular country, including
legacy ERW, attacks using factory-made weapons, and weapons used in other incidents of armed violence that are not terrorist or insurgency related. Classification of IED incidents,
both in terms of containment and means of initiation, is important. By understanding the problem in terms of C-IED

a list of boxes for each of these terms and ask reporting offi-

efforts, the community can appropriately target risk education

cers to select one. This fails the rule of lists, which requires

messages with safe behavior.

a list to be both mutually exclusive and collectively exhaus-

As previously stated, while IEDs can consist of legacy weap-

tive.7 One-dimensional lists simply cannot consider some-

ons, they are unlike ERW (in the context of HMA) in that

thing with two variable attributes without significantly more

they are often active. While some countries may have fields of
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Means of containment

(a)

(b)

1

Letter bomb

2

Pipe bomb

3

Person-born IED (PBIED)

4

Mortar or rocket

5

Buried bomb

6

Box/briefcase/bag

7

Vehicle born IED (VBIED)

Typical means of Initiation

Remarks

Timer Remote Controlled Command Wire Victim operated Suicide
(RCIED)
(CWIED)
(VOIED)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

Other
(h)

(i)

x
x
x

Suicide vest
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

May be an improvised
weapon or factorymade weapon using
improvised launcher
Improvised mine when
operated by victim
Includes typical
roadside bomb, such as
palm oil container
Could be divided into
small, medium or large

Figure 4. DDG IED classification matrix.
Figure courtesy of the author.

legacy improvised mines such as Sri Lanka, these are still the
exception rather than the rule. The entire HMA sector is based

The original article first appeared in the Counter-IED Report,
autumn 2016 edition. It has been edited for The Journal.

on the assumption that when a conflict is over, the population
will be united in wanting ERW removed. In an active conflict,
clearance of active IEDs by HMA actors may be seen as a hostile act. While it may be possible for commercial civilian operators to deal with this, it is difficult for NGO actors to take
a similar position. NGO personnel must already deal with the
dilemma that they cannot be truly impartial, and an NGO
that clears active IEDs is effectively taking part in the wider
counterinsurgency. The security implications for the staff of
that NGO are significant. Yet, some donors are asking NGOs
to undertake IED disposal (IEDD); thus a wider understanding and discussion of the issues are critical for everyone’s clarity of purpose.
DDG has already looked at creating a more detailed risk
analysis for organizations wishing to undertake IED risk education. Furthermore, DDG is working to understand the steps
needed for a humanitarian organization considering whether
or not to undertake IEDD as humanitarian action: both of
which might merit further discussions in later papers.
See endnotes page 64
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